Papuan Development, Conflict and Violence

The Papua Special Autonomy Law is a reconciliation and mutually beneficial solution that is expected to comprehensively, fairly, and dignifiedly resolve the problems in Papua. However, after 20 years (until 2021) and changes have been made (Law No. 2/2021), there is still no serious commitment from the government to end conflict and violence in Papua.

Also read: Violence, Information War, and Vulnerability of Papuan Civilians

What's happening is that conflicts and violence are not subsiding, but rather intensifying in frequency and scale. This is even more so with the return of the designation or label of OPM (Free Papua Organization), which is seen as legalizing and legitimizing repressive actions through various security operations codes. It's not impossible for a military operation to repeat in conflict-prone regions.

Not serious

Actually, changes to the Special Autonomy Law and various implementing regulations, including the Papua Development Acceleration and the BP3OKP, signify that a welfare approach is prioritized and immediately implemented because the existence of the law is no longer threatened by Jakarta.

However, the reality is that since 2022, various internal bureaucratic obstacles at the center have also affected the implementation of its regulatory provisions, including BP3OKP, which has not shown any significant impact in the field.

However, according to the Papua Development Plan (2021-2041), explicit programs have been listed to accelerate the improvement of Papuan welfare through Papua Sehat (health), Papua Pintar (education), and Papua Produktif (people's economy).

The program is funded by the Special Autonomy Fund (2.25 percent) which is allocated to regencies/cities (1.25 percent) and provinces (1 percent), as well as support from ministries/institutions that support the implementation of the special autonomy priority program.

BP3OKP has also not carried out its duties, functions, and roles in the field for synchronization, harmonization, evaluation, and integrated coordination (SHEK). Meanwhile, the Otsus Fund has been disbursed throughout Papua in the 2022-2024 fiscal year. Who should oversee and monitor its implementation?

From various internal conditions of bureaucracy readiness, both in the center and in the regions, the absence of actual implementation in the field indicates a sense that we are not sincere and serious in pushing for the acceleration of Papua's development. We must not let this lead to a counterproductive situation in the field.

Just imagine, the changes to the Special Autonomy Law (Law No. 2/2021) and the Special Autonomy Fund for 2022-2024 have been implemented for three years without any integrated monitoring, supervision, evaluation, and coordination in the field.

The aim is noble, but is hampered by the readiness of the internal bureaucracy and the busy expansion of new autonomous regions (DOB) for provinces in Papua. According to the author, BP3OKP has lost momentum, even raising question marks in society: is the government serious about accelerating development for people in order to improve welfare, or will it repeat the mistakes of the past?

It is indeed not easy to develop Papua with government commitment and policies through a welfare approach.

The community is not demanding anything grandiose, what is important to them is being able to work today, having an income, children attending good schools, and having a healthy and productive community that manages the potential of available resources so there is income. Therefore, the community has economic strength for themselves and their families.

The Papua development acceleration agency should not repeat the mistakes of the past Papua Province and West Papua Province Development Acceleration Unit (UP4B). Unlike UP4B, its advantage is that it has been legalized by the Special Autonomy Law. Its work in the field should be better than UP4B.

There are also questions from critical groups regarding the existence of a body that is expected not only to focus on accelerating development but also on accelerating the resolution of conflicts and violence.

It is impossible for development to be carried out in a situation of high intensity and escalation of conflict and violence. In its job description, this agency only has the status of directing and carrying out SHEK, does not touch political issues, or its approach is prosperity.

Also read: Throughout 2023, 79 people will die as a result of conflict in Papua

Its existence is as a central government agency. Moreover, its leader is the Vice President who is responsible to the President, with three ministers as its members (Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Finance, and Minister of National Development Planning/Bappenas), as well as six representatives from Papua, each representing their respective provinces. They should be able to capture the reality in the field to be aggregated and articulated to the top leadership of the country, in order to encourage a dialogue process for conflict and violence resolution.

There is an opinion among some people stating that conflict and violence only occur in certain regions, especially in the districts of the Mountainous Papua and Central Papua provinces. Such opinion, according to the author's opinion, is wrong. If it is likened to the human body, if one organ is injured or in pain, it will certainly affect the entire anatomy of the human body.

In that context, conflicts and violence, although occurring in some areas, will have an impact and be felt on all development in Papua, even though the level and intensity may vary.

Historical base

The conflict and violence experienced by the Papuan community are based on arguments. Firstly, this has not only been happening in the last decade, but actually since Papua's integration (1963-1969) into the Republic of Indonesia.

Second, some Papuan people have come to the conclusion that the government does not have the political will and goodwill to resolve conflict and violence so it is still using a security approach. In fact, society is psycho-politically apathetic, indifferent, disappointed and frustrated with this situation, especially in areas hit by conflict and violence.

Thirdly, the conflict and violence that have been going on for 61 years (since 1963) have caused what is called by Manuel Kaisiepo as a highly frightening trauma. Therefore, it is not appropriate to simplify the issue.

Fourth, conflicts and violence in Papua are actually not disconnected from the incomplete process of nation-building in Papua. If traced back, the roots of conflict and violence in Papua have a historical political basis since the debate in BPUPKI in the early preparations for Indonesia's independence. That historical basis was the debate between Bung Hatta vs Moh Yamin and Soekarno in June-July 1945, regarding the boundaries of the independent Indonesian state that would be proclaimed (Minutes of the BPUPKI Meeting, Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusabhakti, 2004).

Indeed, it is not easy to develop Papua with the commitment and policies of the government through a welfare approach. It must be realized that developing Papua is different from developing the Papuan people.

Development acceleration is needed on one hand, but on the other hand, at the same time, concrete efforts and actions are also demanded to release Papua from the grip of conflict and violence. This is an absolute requirement so that the acceleration of development towards the welfare of the indigenous Papuan community can be realized after 20 years, or in 2041.

Frans Maniagasi, Local Papuan Politics Observer