The "grand coalition" tendency can partly be explained through cultural explanations.
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By
ULIL ABSHAR-ABDALLA
·4 minutes read
Why do post-reformation Indonesian presidents tend to form a "big coalition" by embracing as many parties as possible and limiting the opposition’s strength as much as possible?
Is this a common trend in all countries or specific to Indonesia? Where does the origin of such "big coalition" political instincts come from? Is it related to Indonesia's distinct political culture? Or is it more related to the "pragmatic" desire of any ruler anywhere who wants solid and effective power? Or is the cause deeper and more structural, namely the design and construction of our political institutions after the reform era?
The tendency to want to build a large coalition like that also appears to be seen in the figure of Prabowo Subianto, the newly elected president whose victory was recently confirmed by the Constitutional Court on Monday (22/4/2024) and was declared by the General Elections Commission on Wednesday (24/4/2024).
Although we cannot be certain definitively, it seems that Prabowo will take a similar path, namely building a "large political tent" in parliament. Since winning the presidential election on February 14, Prabowo has shown political gestures to invite all parties to enter the government that he will lead in the future. He has proactively made visits and met with figures and parties that have been on the opposite side.
Lastly, he visited Muhaimin Iskandar, the President of DPP PKB, as well as his running mate and opponent in the previous presidential election.
On the other hand, a tendency like this is viewed by the civil society as an unhealthy symptom in strengthening and consolidating democracy. For this civil society, a healthy democracy requires a significant opposition force, both within and outside parliament. Personally, I also belong to the group of people who have a political insight like this.
In the past, during the New Order era, there was a fairly heated discussion about the political culture that characterized the authoritarian government of that time. One of the explanations used to describe the strong power of President Soeharto at that time was the culture of harmony that characterizes Javanese society. This culture tends to avoid conflict and strives for consultation, consensus, mutual agreement, and mutual cooperation. Soeharto's policies that emphasized consensus and "opposed" political opposition at that time were explained through this cultural genesis.
Interestingly, after the reformation, this kind of cultural explanation almost disappeared completely. The fading of cultural schools in our current political analysis is very understandable. Since the reformation, there have been rapid changes in Indonesia's political landscape. Cultural explanations lose their "theoretical efficacy" to explain rapid changes. It seems that this cultural explanation is only appropriate in a stagnant political context such as in the New Order era.
However, is it true that cultural explanations have become less relevant? A friend once posed the following questions: Why are serious polemics rare in Indonesia? Why do all disputes - whether theoretical or non-theoretical - in this country always end quickly with a "middle way"? Why does our society seem afraid to express ideas to the fullest extent? Why does every debate seem to want to be quickly resolved? Is it because we are afraid of disturbing social security and tranquility?
My friend attempted to answer with speculation: perhaps the issue is related to culture. The dominant culture in this country is harmony, not dialectics. In a culture of harmony, pressure tends to be directed towards consensus, not conflict.
Such speculation seems reasonable although somewhat difficult to prove. The weakness of cultural explanations is that they tend to be "arbitrary", selective and essentialistic. Nevertheless, cultural explanations still have a strong appeal. The question is: does the tendency of our post-reform presidents to build large political coalitions have anything to do with this culture of harmony? Or is the explanation somewhere else?
Certainly, we cannot ignore cultural explanations. I think that, although inadequate, the tendency for a "large coalition" and the desire to build a dominant "middle path" politics in Indonesia can be partially explained through cultural explanations.
Another important explanation is the great challenge faced by the President of Indonesia after the reform: to build effective power to ensure that development runs smoothly.
The combination of a presidential system and a multi-party political system presents a challenging task for post-reform Indonesia's rulers. How can a stable and effective government be built? How can an effective and strong government be achieved without sacrificing the imperative of democracy?
Clearly, this is not an easy challenge. On the one hand, democracy has become Indonesia's "ninja road"; on the other hand, prosperity must also be pursued through development. The choice is not "either this or that", but both.
Editor:
ANTONIUS PONCO ANGGORO
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